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Milo Shaoqing Wang, Christopher Steele and Royston Greenwood pose an interesting 
challenge to my interpretation of institutional logics. They suggest that rather than, in their 
words, starting with a list and ‘looking for manifestations’, we ought to look at historical 
specificities, examining how logics emerge from combinations of events and mentalitiés. 
Such emergence requires taking a ‘bottom up’ approach to history, examining, in particular, 
processes of collective memory making. While I agree that one task of the historian is to 
explore such processes, there is a danger in reducing the tasks of history to just that. Rather, 
historians have sought to test the memories that actors construct against the evidence that the 
historical record provides, as I explore in a little more detail below. However, before doing 
that I wish to address a couple of points that perhaps were not clear in my original 
formulations.  
To begin with, I am not convinced that I advocated starting with a list of logics and then 
looking for manifestations. The task of historical investigation is rather more complex than 
that. It tends to involve a dialogue between the evidence that is found and interpreted from 
the sources that survive and more abstract concepts. I am happy to agree that concrete 
analysis needs to place these more abstract concepts in particular contexts of time and place. 
In carrying out such investigations, it is clear that new logics can emerge from the activities 
that persons engage in. Such, indeed, was Weber’s account of the emergence of knowledge as 
a distinct sphere of value from the institutional order that was religion (Weber, 1948: 351). 
However, it was an emergence that continued to be coloured by the nature of that emergence, 
something which historians of particular organizations for the production and transmission of 
knowledge, such as universities, acknowledge (Clark, 2006). In addition, I agree with the 
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authors that ‘some logics – however common elsewhere – may be absent’. If I gave the 
impression that all the logics that I outlined are ‘inevitably manifested in different historical 
contexts’ then that is the fault of my efforts at explanation. Moreover, I am not trying to posit 
some sense of invariable ‘needs’. I recognise that the character of such ‘needs’ or ‘wants’ are 
themselves historically shaped, conditioned by the changing balance and manifestations of 
differing logics.  
What Wang, Steele and Greenwood are pointing to, I think, is the enduring conundrum at the 
heart of historical sociology. For the historian, the abstract schemes of the sociologist fail to 
pay attention to the contingency of situated action; for the sociologist, the historian’s focus on 
detail tends to obscure patterns that underlie such actions. It is in order to address such 
tensions that the social theorist Margaret Archer posits the need to develop what she terms 
‘analytical histories of emergence’: 
analytical narratives of emergence can never ever be grand precisely because the 
imperative to narrate derives from recognizing the intervention of contingency and the 
need to examine its effects on the exercise or suspension of the generative powers in 
question — since outcomes will vary accordingly but unpredictably. On the other 
hand, analytical narratives are obviously distinct from any version of historical 
narration tout court, for although social realists in general have no difficulty in 
accepting the strong likelihood of uniqueness at the level of events, the endorsement 
of real but unobservable generative mechanisms directs analysis towards the interplay 
between the real, the actual and the empirical to explain precise outcomes (Archer, 
1995: 343). 
That is, the suspicion is that ‘grand’ theories of social action (such as Marxism) invite the 
tendency to simply ‘read off’ human action from the specification of the founding conditions 
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that the theory predicts. Examining specific historical episodes indicates the impacts that 
occur in specific events. However, the task of historical sociology is not just to rest with such 
events; rather, it is to use analytical frameworks to seek to explain outcomes. I have 
suggested that using institutional logics as such a framework helps to explain the patterned 
outcomes that we observe and, in particular, gives us a way of attending to comparative 
analysis.  
I am not convinced that the focus that the authors suggest on events and mentalités resolves 
this tension so much as it expresses it. That is, the discussion of the nature of events in 
historical sociology has often focused on the large-scale happenings that appear to mark 
significant and irreversible changes of direction. Notable in this category is the study of 
revolutions, especially those in France and Russia. However, historians such as William 
Sewell who have sought to examine the conceptualization of events give us a note of caution 
here.  He observes that ruptures from expected courses of action occur frequently (every day, 
he suggests) ‘as a consequence of exogenous causes, of contradictions between structures, of 
sheer human inventiveness or perversity, or of simple mistakes in enacting routines. But most 
ruptures are neutralized and reabsorbed into the preexisting structures in one way or another - 
they may, for example, be forcefully repressed, pointedly ignored, or explained away as 
exceptions’ (Sewell, 2005: 227). Events might provide us with a useful lens for examining 
the nature of the logics at play and their shifting balance, but they need to be placed in a 
broader context. Historians often stress the extended nature of change, one involving multiple 
actors and events over an extended period. It makes sense, argues the political scientist Paul 
Pierson (2004), to talk not of institutional change but of institutional development. Too much 
of a focus on the event, that is, runs the danger, as I have argued elsewhere, of smuggling the 
rational actor back in to institutional theory (Mutch, 2007). Their nature and outcomes, that 
is, are conditioned by wider structures, amongst which might be the mentalités that shape 
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them. And here is where the tension is unresolved, for such mentalités are, in the works of the 
Annales school, enduring.  
Perhaps my focus on the enduring nature of such mentalités has been colored by my own 
work on religion. I have, for example, in part inspired by the focus on institutional theory on 
taken for granted practices, examined the archival sources for traces of the governance 
practices at work in the eighteenth century Churches of Scotland and England. Understanding 
the distinctive contrasts found in this detailed study of governance practices in the two 
countries required placing them in the broader institutional context that both conditioned 
them and that they reproduced. Examining this context for Scotland in particular stressed an 
inter-related set of religious, legal and educational systems (Mutch 2015). Emergent from 
their mutually reinforcing features was a distinctive set of ideas – a mentalité, if you wish – 
that featured an obsession with order, a predilection for written rules of procedure and an 
emphasis on the written word. Such a mentalité lay behind Scottish pre-eminence in 
accounting and accountability from the eighteenth century to the late nineteenth century, with 
influences on other areas of the world (Mutch, 2016). It also, I have sought to argue, had 
enduring consequences that linger to this day (as discussed, for example, in Craig (2011)). 
Yet, when I turned to the leading work on institutional logics (Thornton, Occasio and 
Lounsbury, 2012), I found that neither the law nor education featured. It was to explain these 
absences that I sought to abstract from the historical record, informed, as Wang, Steele and 
Greenwood say, by historians like Huizinga and Friedson, but also by the work of Max 
Weber on value spheres, in order to develop concepts that would be abstract enough to form 
the basis for contextualised work located in particular aspects of time and space.  
A further challenge is posed by the emphasis of the authors on the importance of collective 
memory in the generation of and adherence to logics. The importance of emotional, 
embodied responses to institutional logics is beginning to be addressed (Voronov and Vince, 
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2012; Weick, 2018) and has in it echoes of the focus of students of the nation state on the 
emotional, as opposed to cognitive, attachment to nationalism. As Benedict Anderson (1991) 
famously argued, such attachments involve the construction of imaginary collectivities, 
bound together by attachment to symbols. As Michael Billing has emphasised in his study of 
‘banal nationalism’, the important symbol ‘is not a flag which is being consciously waved 
with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building’ (Billig, 1995: 8). 
Thus it is certainly important to examine how collective memories shape the nature and take 
up of such symbols. However, historians have also long challenged the basis of such 
collective memories, especially in the examination of the invention of tradition. Historians 
have often been able to show that many ‘traditions’ which claim enduring status are in fact 
rather recent inventions (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). Memory can thus be faulty. One 
interesting illustration of this point is supplied by the legal scholar James Whitman in his 
discussion of German dignitary law. Such law, which seeks to afford legal protection to 
human dignity, is often located by German jurists in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
However, argues Whitman, the  
ideas of ‘respect’ and ‘personal honour’ that inform the current law and culture of 
insult are, in turn, deeply rooted in German society and in German social history. In 
particular, the law of insult, as it exists today, has aristocratic sources. Germans 
involved in insult litigation display a kind of touchy sense of their own ‘honour’ that 
is very much reminiscent of the old aristocratic duellists’ world of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries (Whitman, 2013: 332). 
 From historical work he concludes ‘Interviewing local informants is a very poor way of fully 
understanding what is going on in European dignitary law. The participants themselves do 
not understand where their system came from, nor why it takes the form it takes’ (Whitman, 
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2013: 334). While it is important for historians to take account of such faulty memories, their 
task should not be conflated with them.  
While work which explores the configurations of substance and practices at any particular 
point in time and space is both valuable and necessary, the dangers of inductively building 
out from such instances is mirrored in the work on institutional logics that draws only on the 
instances that have been examined in the organizational literature (Thornton, Occasio and 
Lounsbury, 2012). This runs the risk of ignoring large areas of social life and of failing to 
meet the mission of the original authors to ‘bring society back in’ (Friedland and Alford, 
1991). While I accept that my criteria for positing that spheres such as play, education, the 
law and the military are fundamental to the human construction of social structure are always 
open to debate and questioning, the enterprise of seeking to construct abstract analytical 
categories out of the record of human activity is, I contend, a valuable one.  
The philosopher Julian Baggini (2018) has pointed out the dangers of ‘pseudo-universalism’, 
where phenomena that pertain to a particular time and place are illicitly generalized to cover 
all of humanity. As he observes ‘the aspiration for the universal becomes a crude insistence 
on the uniform. Sensitivity is lost to the very different needs of different cultures at different 
times and places’ (Baggini, 2018). It is a danger that is particularly associated with ‘Western’ 
schools of philosophy (and, one might argue, some branches of organizational analysis). But 
he also recognizes that ‘mistrust of the universalist aspiration, however, can go too far’ 
(Baggini, 2018). That is, our conceptualizations have to strike a balance between abstract 
formulations that derive from common dilemmas facing humankind and the particular ways 
in which such dilemmas are addressed. We need, that is, both the focus on the local and 
particular that Wang, Steele and Greenwood argue for and the construction of analytical 
frameworks that transcend such particularities. 
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